Agricultural Horizons: Research, Technology and Sustainable Development Vol. 5

Low crop-insurance uptake is frequently attributed to inadequate farmer awareness or excessive reluctance to engage with unfamiliar financial products. These explanations are incomplete because non-purchase can also reflect poor protection, unaffordable payment schedules, unreliable institutions and the availability of alternative ways to manage risk. This critical narrative review integrates economic theory, field experiments, observational research and recent reviews to explain when low uptake represents a remediable constraint, an informed choice or exclusion from a functioning insurance market. Literature eligible through 1 August 2026 was identified through targeted searches of openly accessible scholarly records and citation tracing. Evidence was evaluated according to identification strategy, contract type, outcome measurement, implementation conditions and geographical transferability. The strongest evidence supports substantial sensitivity to premiums and payment timing, together with context-dependent effects of information, trust, subsidies and complementary technologies. Basis risk complicates the conventional prediction that greater risk aversion increases insurance demand: a farmer can pay a premium and still receive nothing after a damaging loss. Behavioural mechanisms matter, but apparent biases are difficult to distinguish from reasonable beliefs about product quality and institutional performance. Information may reduce willingness to insure when it reveals previously misunderstood exclusions. Social networks can transmit knowledge and support risk sharing, while gendered resource control and administrative requirements determine whose preferences become observable purchases. Initial enrolment, sustained renewal and improvements in household welfare are distinct outcomes and should not be treated as interchangeable measures of success. A sequential diagnostic framework is proposed to connect access, protective value, financial feasibility, institutional credibility and learning. Policy should prioritise reliable protection and accountable delivery before attempting to maximise sales through persuasion. The central unresolved issue is not whether insurance can benefit farmers, but which contracts, delivery arrangements and public investments produce durable protection for particular farming households.